Ideas from 'Reason, Truth and History' by Hilary Putnam [1981], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Reason, Truth and History' by Putnam,Hilary [CUP 1998,0-521-29776-1]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom

7623	For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

4714	Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [O'Grady]

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

7617	Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

4716	The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [O'Grady]

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

7616	Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism

14203

Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms

14207

If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

14214

If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Lewis]

14205

The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

7610	A fact is simply what it is rational to accept

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

7618	Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

4718	If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [O'Grady]

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

7620	Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism

14204

Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality

7611	Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing

18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth

14200

'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

7612	Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

7613	Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

14202

Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference

14201

Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

14206

There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value

7624	The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values